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Abstract 
Operating in markets which include the characteristics of both the perfect and imperfect 
competitions has never been so easy for a firm, while setting an acceptable price. 
Various firms show various pricing behavior to generate and maximize revenues. This 
paper is an attempt to encompass pricing behaviors of firms when consumers have 
imperfect recall for the past prices of the products, while giving a thought to ponder 
that which of the behaviors has an optimal rationale when a firm sets market price for a 
commodity. The findings concludes that firms set prices as similar as monopolist when 
the consumers of their products have imperfect recall for price they offered already in 
yore. 
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 1. Introduction 
There is hardly someone who knows the price of a given consumption good in the stores even though 
the stores; they are operated from the immediate vicinities. One may have a quite fair idea on the 
average price level at different stores but one does not recall the precise price of golden apples. The 
textbook model of price competition for homogeneous goods assumes however that consumers, they 
are fully informed about the prices posted by the firms. 
 The Marketing literature has commented upon it for decades. Monroe and Lee (1999) in their 
price-awareness research, confirm that the average absolute recall error ranges from 6% to 19.45% 
for the correct price. But such recall errors have been neglected by the various firms which implied 
that in the basic price competition model with a homogeneous good firms charge a markup over the 
cost and those profits are therefore non-zero. In this paper two models for pricing behavior of firms 
when consumers have imperfect recall are proposed which includes setting up the price which 
depends upon firm’s own cost and setting up the price which depend upon the other firm’s cost. The 
imperfect recall on prices is modeled in this connection as a random shock (with mean zero) that is 
added to the real price. Consumers decide where to shop following their wrongly recalled prices, but 
at the stores the demanded quantity of the goods is a function of their real prices and the firms are 
however fully rational and maximize their profits anticipating the errors of the consumers. The 
proposed models are so to speak as the static games; which can be interpreted as the (constant) 
outcome of a repeated game where there is no learning process by the consumers and the firms then 
take the advantage of such shortcomings while setting the price on the basis of either its own cost or 
its competitor’s cost. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
Various pricing behaviors of firms have been interrogated by several of authors from now and then. 
Hehenkamp (2002) proposed a game where consumers only receive information about the prices of 
the firms with some given probability. Sellers on the other hand have a probability of learning about 
the other sellers' prices and profits, while, operating in an imperfect market. Depending on the level 
of passiveness, i.e. frequency with which they receive new information, the equilibrium price is set 
between the marginal cost and monopoly pricing regimes. Chen, Iyer, and Pazgal (2005) use the 
limited memory model of Dow (1991), where consumers do not recall the exact price but only a price 
range to which it belongs which compels firms to choose a random price strategy, where the number 
of possible prices equals the number of memory partitions. Gabaix and Laibson (2004); Gabaix, 
Laibson, and Li (2005) confirmed that the consumers make errors when evaluating the value of a 
product, which allow an increase in noise of the product evaluation and the utter benefits then go to 
the firms in shape of setting up high prices. Gabaix and Laibson (2006) stressed that consumers are 
unable to fully take into account the add-on charge, so that firms have positive profits. The seminal 
paper by Diamond (1971) assumes that consumers do not know the prices of firms; they visit 
different stores, only purchase when a price below a given cutoff price is found. Hence, the prices 
will be adjusted in between the firm’s own marginal cost and the monopoly pricing zones. While, 
Baye and Morgan (2004); Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar (2004) indicate that price dispersion exists in 
settings which are very close to the textbook Bertrand competition. 
 Varian (1980) concluded that the firms choose a random pricing strategy, in opposition to a 
fixed price. That is, the strategy space is a set of probability distributions, not the positive real 
numbers. Varian (1980) further stressed that the consumers are persistently unaware and uninformed 
about the prices. Therefore, if stores are allowed to choose a random price distribution, they choose 
such equilibrium price which might balance the probability of having the lowest price and hence 
maximizing profits with the uninformed consumers. Spiegler (2006) comes to a similar conclusion 
when all consumers are unable to memorize the random pricing strategy of firms and has the 
imperfect recall, which enables most of the firms to set the prices as per their wish while exploiting 
the consumer’s imperfect recall. 
 
 
 3. Basic setup of Model  
Consider two risk neutral firms, E and F, selling one homogeneous good whose cost of production is 
zero (assumed). Firms announce their market prices simultaneously, pE by firm E and pF by firm F.  
Consumer   [0, 1] recalls prices 	
 = 	
 + 
 , for I = E, F, where  and   are independently, 
autonomously and identically distributed bumps/ shocks for each  with non-degenerate probability 
density function f(.) and cumulative distribution function F(.) with an expected value of zero. The 
consumers/ buyers then do their shopping/ buying at the firm with the lowest recalled price (it can be 
assumed that they randomize in case of a tie, which happens with probability zero). At the store they 
learn the real price so the demand curve is therefore given and translated by the real and not the 
recalled price. The intuition is that the consumer adapts its demand or choice of consumptions when 
confronted with the real price, in the same that consumer reacts to price promotions and try to bargain 
with it that he/ she sees in a store.  
 
4. Conceptual Findings 
It is assumed that costs of transportation between the two firms are husky. Where g(x) is the market 
share of a firm whose price is lower than its rival’s price by x. it is given by g(x) =   +
. Moreover g(x) is independent of  because all consumers have the same price recall shock 
distribution. Now given the behavior of buyers/ consumers, firm i, i = E, F, maximizes expected 
profits ∏ 	
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loss of generality, in terms of price setting, it is assumed that  = 1. The first order condition for a 
maximum is 
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 is the price elasticity of demand. Notice that this equation can be rewritten as  
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4.1 Recall mistake and Hotelling trade-off 
In the basic model where consumers suffer a price recall shock and firms face zero costs, the firms are 
able to charge a nonnegative price in equilibrium p* satisfying. 
 
 
2	∗0 =  1 +  )	∗         (3) 
 Each firm opts between the increase of market share achieved through lower price, and the 
revenue per consumer achieved through higher price. This tradeoff shows up in equation (3) in the 
term g’(0), which stands for the marginal decrease in the market share due to a price increase. In other 
words, it is the marginal change of the indifferent consumer as in Hotelling models.  
 Thus, in this model firms are able to manipulate the bounded rationality of consumers. The 
intuition of the result, in opposition to the zero/ no profit solution, marginal propensity of the 
indifferent consumer is more or less similar as in Hotelling models.  
The term g’(0) is lower for huskier variance. The intuition is straightforward, the more difficulties the 
consumers have in remembering and therefore comparing the prices, the larger price variation the 
firms have. Suppose the change of the variance is achieved through the “spreading” of the potential 
random values, that is changing of x to σx with σ > 0. The new function (density function) f satisfies 
σ f (σx) = fo(x), with fo(x) standing for f(x) with σ = 1, so that   =  78 978   =
  9 = 1, where  =  78  and / = 7 was used.  
 
 The new variance is given by ;<= = 7>;<=. The term g’(0) appearing in equation (3) 
changes according to  
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 Or simply0 =  78  9 0, where 9 0 is the 0 for σ = 1. The variation in the new 
equilibrium price is seen in the new version of equation (3) 
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 Implicit differentiation of above yields 
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 As expected, higher price uncertainty 7 means higher price markup. Compared to the fixed 
demand case (take 	 =  )	 = 0 ) this influence is however smaller, because the denominator is 
now bigger and the numerator smaller (re-member that 0 ≤ 1 +  )	∗ < 1 ). The intuition is that 
firms must also take the diminishing demand into account. It is not true that the marginal increase of 
the price due to 7 is always diminishing, for it depends on the value of )′	∗. Two extreme results 
can however be established.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
As we know that the monopolists always try to charge an additional and maximum markup while 
exploiting the conditions of imperfect knowledge the consumers have about the market. The findings 
of this paper also confirms that the firms enjoys the imperfect recall the consumers have for prices of 
various goods, and thence behave like a monopolist while charging the markups and goes for 
maximal possible markups. The mark ups increases with the incorrect re call the consumers have for 
products prices, once the awareness of the price is dropped to zero the price dispersion becomes so 
husky and due to imperfect recall the consumers do not as such fully react the price differences. 
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